Gulf aviation: navigating the storm

Key findings

Executive summary

Day Zero: 28 February 2026

The US-Iran conflict escalated beyond proxy warfare. Iranian retaliation targeted civilian aviation infrastructure for the first time in the country's modern history. Debris from drones and missiles struck Dubai International's Terminal 3 and Zayed International's departure hall, killing one person and injuring eleven. The UAE's General Civil Aviation Authority immediately closed the country's airspace. Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Oman followed within hours.

The world's three largest long-haul hubs — Dubai (DXB), Doha (DOH), and Abu Dhabi (AUH) — went dark simultaneously. More than twenty thousand passengers were stranded in UAE terminals; thousands more at Hamad International. The global air transport network lost its central organising node.

The collapse

Emirates operated 24 flights on 1 March, down from a typical 380. Qatar Airways suspended all scheduled operations. Etihad halted departures and arrivals. Gulf Air's single hub at Bahrain International closed to civilian traffic with no reopening timeline. flydubai lost most of its regional network overnight.

The airline that adapted most effectively was not the largest. Etihad's controlled ramp-up — ferrying A350-1000s from Istanbul and Muscat, 787-9s from Cairo, and keeping aircraft in holding patterns at safe airports — allowed faster recovery than its larger competitors. Gulf Air's operational improvisation — bus transfers across the King Fahd Causeway to Dammam, with Saudi transit visas coordinated for passengers — demonstrated that in a crisis, flexibility matters more than fleet size.

The recovery

By mid-April, Emirates had reached 70% of pre-war capacity. Etihad: 60%. Qatar Airways: 50%. flydubai: 40%. A US-Iran ceasefire announced on 8 April remains fragile. EASA extended its advisory through at least 1 May.

The structural implication is clear: the Gulf mega-hub model, built on single-point concentration, is a systemic vulnerability. When the airspace around that point closes without warning, fleet size and route breadth are irrelevant. The airlines that recovered fastest were those that moved earliest and remained most flexible.

FIR-by-FIR closure analysis

EASA CZIB 2026-03-R5 designated twelve Flight Information Regions as Level 2 (highest risk): OIIX (Tehran), OBBB (Bahrain), ORBB (Baghdad), OJAI (Amman), OLBA (Beirut), HECC (Cairo), ORMM (Basrah), OIYY (Yazd), OISS (Shiraz), OIKK (Kerman), OIBB (Bandar Abbas), and OMAE (Abu Dhabi FIR — partial).

Each closure followed a distinct timeline. OIIX closed first, within hours of the initial strikes. OBBB and ORBB followed immediately. OJAI and OLBA restricted overflights but maintained limited arrival/departure corridors. OMAE opened a narrow western corridor via LUDID on 7 March, allowing limited Emirates and Etihad operations. Qatar's FIR (OTBB) remained fully closed until 15 April, with emergency-only corridors via LAEEB and DATRI for relief flights.

Airline-by-airline impact

Emirates

Emirates' response was the most dramatic in scale: from 380+ daily flights to 24 on 1 March. The airline's fleet of 262 aircraft allowed rapid redeployment once corridors opened. By 23 April, Emirates exceeded 400 daily flights for the first time since 27 February, reaching 80% of pre-war capacity. President Tim Clark characterised the recovery as "minute-by-minute", acknowledging that even the UAE's self-produced Jet A-1 could not guarantee stable supply chains in a contested airspace.

Qatar Airways

Qatar Airways was hit hardest in relative terms. Without an alternative hub — Hamad International was completely inaccessible — the airline's only operations for weeks were relief flights carrying aid and evacuees via emergency corridors. Full scheduled service did not resume until mid-April, and then at approximately 50% capacity.

Etihad

Etihad's smaller fleet (92 aircraft) proved to be an operational advantage. The airline executed a controlled ramp-up: A350-1000s ferried from Istanbul and Muscat, 787-9s from Cairo. By mid-April, Etihad had reached 60% of operations. The repositioning strategy — keeping aircraft in holding patterns at safe airports rather than grounding them at the hub — allowed faster recovery than Emirates or Qatar.

Gulf Air

Gulf Air entered the crisis in the most exposed position. Its single hub, Bahrain International, closed to civilian traffic with no reopening timeline. The airline's response — bus transfers across the King Fahd Causeway to Dammam (KFIA), with Saudi transit visas coordinated for passengers — became one of the crisis's most remarkable operational improvisations. Gulf Air operated limited flights from KFIA throughout the crisis period.

flydubai

flydubai's regional network was devastated by the FIR closures, which eliminated most routes to the Caucasus, Central Asia, and South Asia. Recovery to 40% by mid-April reflected the airline's heavy reliance on corridors that remained restricted. The airline's smaller long-haul fleet meant fewer alternatives for route displacement.

War risk insurance and fuel supply

War risk insurance premiums for Gulf operations increased 300–500% in the immediate aftermath. Additional hull war premiums of $0.50–1.50 per $1,000 of insured value were imposed across the board. For Emirates' fleet of 262 aircraft (average insured value approximately $150m each), this represents an additional $20–60m in annual insurance costs.

Fuel supply disruption is compounding the problem. IATA's Director General warned that restoring Middle East fuel supply chains will take months. Delta Air Lines expects an additional $2bn in fuel expenses in Q2 alone. While the UAE produces and refines its own Jet A-1, the global spot market has tightened significantly, pushing up prices for airlines without domestic refining capacity.

GPS spoofing across the Persian Gulf has caused civil aircraft to deviate from cleared paths by up to 30 nautical miles, raising the spectre of accidental engagement by active air defence systems. Airlines are now required to cross-check GPS with ground-based navaids in affected areas, adding workload and reducing efficiency.

Recovery forecast

These projections assume the current US-Iran ceasefire holds and EASA progressively downgrades its CZIB. A resumption of hostilities would reset all timelines. The structural implication remains: single-hub dependency is a systemic vulnerability that no amount of fleet size can overcome during airspace closures.

Alternative routes and corridors

Northern bypass: South Caucasus

The corridor through Georgia (UGGG), Armenia (UDGG), and Azerbaijan (UBBB) became the primary northern bypass. These FIRs experienced unprecedented ATC saturation, with overflight requests increasing 200–300% above normal. Georgia's airspace capacity was pushed to its limits, requiring coordination with Eurocontrol for flow management.

Southern bypass: Saudi-Omani corridor

The route through Saudi Arabia (OEJD) and Oman (OOMM) provided an alternative for east-west traffic avoiding the Gulf. This corridor was less saturated than the Caucasus route but added significant distance to Europe-Asia flights. Oman's ATC infrastructure handled the increased load well, with Muscat ACC coordinating priority routing for Emirates and Etihad.

Timeline